Computer technology is increasingly bringing information which was previously the preserve of experts into people's homes. We address the question of whether Artificial Intelligence can make accessible, to ordinary individuals, expert help in ethical decision-making. We propose an Ethical Decision Assistant and raise some important issues its design needs to address. There is a necessary role for subjective values in making certain decisions. It is also important to recognise that emotion as well as abstract reasoning affects the actions people ultimately take. We suggest that Virtual Reality may have a role to play in realising the latter. A related issue concerns public policy decisions which affect the lives of ordinary individuals and yet are beyond their control. AI technology has the potential, we argue, to increase the consistency, impartiality, and accountability of policy-making. What we have in mind is an expert system, incorporating the experiences of a range of individuals, which can take on the role of Devil's Advocate in challenging the assumptions of decision-making professionals.
Introduction
Practical ethics typically addresses itself to such general issues as whether we ought to carry out abortions or slaughter animals for meat, and, if so, under what circumstances. The answers to these questions have a useful role to play in the development of social policy and legislation. They are, arguably, less useful to the ordinary individual wanting to ask: "Ought I, in my particular circumstances, and with my particular values, to have an abortion/eat veal?" Such diverse ethical theories as Utilitarianism (Mill, 1861) and Existentialism (MacQuarrie, 1972) do address themselves to the question of how we ought to go about making such decisions. The problem with these, however, is that they are generally inaccessible to the individual facing a moral dilemma. This is where AI comes in. It is ideally suited to exploring the processes of ethical reasoning and decisionmaking, and computer technology such as the world wide web is increasingly making accessible to the individual information which has only been available to "experts" in the past. However, there are questions which remain to be asked such as: ¢ Could we design an Ethical Decision Assistant for everyone? i.e., could we provide it with a set of minimal foundational principles without either committing it to, or excluding users from, subscribing to some ethical theory or religious code? ¢ What would its limitations be? i.e., how much could/ should it do for us and what must we decide for ourselves? ¢ How holistic need it be? i.e., should it be restricted to "pure" ethical reasoning or need it consider the wider issues of action and the motivations underlying it?
These are the questions we will address below. Let us also be explicit about what we are not going to do. It is not our aim to construct a machine which mirrors human ethical decision making, rather we want to chart new territory, to discover alternative ways of approaching ethics. We want to consider how the differences between computers and people can be exploited in designing reasoning systems that may help us to overcome some of our own limitations.
Automating Ethical Reasoning
They are speaking to me still, he decided, in the geometry I delight in, in the figures that beget more figures. I will answer them as of old with the infinity I feed on. Thomas (1996) As human decision makers, our consideration of the consequences of our actions tends to be limited depthwise to the more immediate consequences, and breadthwise to those we can imagine or which we consider most probable and relevant. Given a complex dilemma, we can harness the power of computers to help us to better think through the potential consequences of our actions. However, if we are not to suffer from information overload, we must provide the computer with some notion of a morally relevant consequence. For example, killing someone is, in itself, an undesirable consequence, whereas making someone happy is a desirable one. We also need to provide some notion of moral weightiness. For example, it would be an unusual human who thought it acceptable to kill someone so long as it made someone else happier.
Immediately it is apparent that we are going to have to import a lot of our ethical baggage into our ethical decision system. Have we already committed it to too much by focusing on the consequences of action? We think not. If someone's religion commits them to taking the Pope's decree that abortion should be shunned except that it save the mother's life, then they may not be interested in exploring the consequences of an abortion. But then this person is not in need of an Ethical Decision Assistant: they already have one! Absolute commandments such as "Thou shalt not kill" seem not to allow for consideration of consequences. However, what if we are forced to choose between a course of action which results in the death of one person, and one which results in the death of another? Here, the prescription not to kill is of no help. A woman forced to choose between saving her own life and that of her unborn child will therefore need to explore the consequences of the courses of action open to her.
We are aware that we are glossing over the well known distinction between Actions and Omissions. Without going into this issue in any depth, we will just point out the kind of undesirable consequence that assuming we are responsible for the consequences of our actions, but not our omissions, would have. For example, it would mean that it would always be unacceptable to carry out an abortion even to save a life. This is an absolutist and prescriptive stance which prevents the user from exploring the consequences of their decisions for themselves. For this reason, we will assume the consequences of our omissions to be of the same gravity as the consequences of our actions.
Subjectivity
Every thing possible to be believe'd is an image of truth.
Blake (1789)
Below we will set out a series of scenarios to illustrate the limitations of AI reasoning. These are intended to show that, when it comes to the most difficult, angstridden decisions, computers can't provide the answers for us. If they are to allow for the subjective values of individuals, they can at best provide us with awareness of the factors involved in our decision-making, together with the morally relevant consequences of our actions.
Consider the following moral dilemmas.
Dilemma 1
Suppose you were faced with making a choice that will result in the certain loss of five lives, or one which may result in the loss of no lives, but will most probably result in the loss of ten lives. What would you do? The human response in these situations is typically "irrational" (Slovic, 1990 ) -if there is the hope of life, however small, the human will usually risk it. So chances are you would go for the latter option. Your computer might explain to you why this is the "wrong" decision, and you might find the differences between its reasoning and yours enlightening. But are you persuaded to change your mind?
Dilemma 2
Imagine you are being bullied by someone at work. She is a single parent. If you register a formal complaint, she will lose her job and her children will suffer. However, if you do nothing, other people will suffer at her hands. Whatever you do, or do not do, there will be morally undesirable consequences. How can your computer help here?
Dilemma 3
Suppose we are going to war against another country where terrible atrocities are being committed and you have been called up. You know that by taking part in the war you will contribute to the killing of innocent civilians. However, if you do not take part, you are passively contributing to the continuation of the atrocities. Your computer cannot decide for you whether the ends of aggression justify the means.
Of the dilemmas above, (1) could be approached probabilistically without reference to human values. But is handing such a decision over to a computer the right approach? We value the opportunity to attempt to save lives, and abhor the choice to sacrifice some lives for the sake of others. Is acting upon this principle not a valid alternative to the probabilistic approach? (2) and (3) are exactly the kinds of dilemmas we would like to be able to hand over to our computer program. But in such cases, where awareness of the relevant consequences gives rise to rather than resolves the dilemma, handing the decision over would be as much of an abdication of responsibility as tossing a coin.
So our Ethical Decision Assistant will be just thatan assistant. A computer cannot tell us which is the best action for a given human to take, unless it is endowed with every faculty of general human nature and experience, as well as the specific nature and experiences of the person/ persons needing to make a decision. The ethical decisions which humans make depend on the subjective profiles and values of individuals. A woman might be willing to give up her own life to save her child, whereas she may not be willing to die for her sister. She might be prepared to pay to send her son to private school, but not her daughter. In such cases, the role of the Ethical Decision Assistant is in making us aware of the subjective filters we employ in decision making. It can prompt us with questions about why we make the distinctions we do. We can "justify" our decisions with talk of "maternal love" or "selfish genes", and "gender roles" or "ability to benefit". Our EDA is not going to argue with us. However, if we also incorporated learning into it, it could get to know us and point out to us the patterns and inconsistencies underlying our decisions. This may then prompt us to rethink our values, but the decision to change will be ours.
Decision and Action
Thou shouldst not have been old till thou hadst been wise. Shakespeare (1623) We are also interested in the distinction between convincing someone a particular course of action is the best one and actually getting them to take it. The gap between our ideals and our actions manifests itself in the perennial problem of "weakness of will". Someone sees a chocolate cream cake in the window. Careful deliberation tells them they had really better not. And then they go ahead and have it anyway. One cream cake today may not be much cause for regret. But one every day for the next twenty years might well be! The questions here are:
¢ Why do we do such things?
¢ Can AI help us to do otherwise?
We speculate that the answer to the first question is to do with the immediacy, and so reality, of the pleasure of eating the cream cake, as contrasted with the distance, and perceived unreality, of the long-term consequences of the daily fix. In answer to the second question, we suggest that there may be a role for Virtual Reality in "realising" for us the consequences of our actions. This sounds perhaps more like the realm of therapy than ethics. But, as the examples below show, we are talking about actions which have morally relevant consequences.
Weakness 1
You smoke 60 cigarettes a day. Your computer (amongst others!) tells you it will harm the development of your children and eventually kill you. There are no equally weighty considerations that favour smoking, so you should give up. You see the sense of your computer's reasoning, and on New Year's Day give up smoking. But within the week you have started again.
Weakness 2
After a hard day's work, you have driven your colleagues to the pub. You are desperately stressed and feel you need to get drunk to lose your inhibitions and relax. You know you should not because drinking and driving is dangerous and potentially fatal. But you are unable to stop yourself succumbing to the immediate temptation of a few pints.
Weakness 3
You are desperately in love with your best friend's spouse and plans are afoot to abandon your respective families and move in with each other. Your computer lists all the undesirable consequences that are the most likely result of this move and advises you that you will regret it and ought to stay put. You appreciate the good sense of this advice, but your libido gets the better of you.
In all the above cases, the computer will not be alone in any frustration at its inability to get you to actually act upon what you believe to be right. We humans learn from our experience and wish to pass the benefit of it onto others so that they may avoid our regrets. But something seems to be lost in the transmission! To an extent this may be a good thing. Different individuals and different circumstances require different responses. But need the cost of this flexibility be unceasing repetition of the same old mistakes? We suggest that there may be a further role for AI to play here. Providing us with awareness of the consequences of our actions is useful, but abstract argument may not be enough by itself to persuade us to change into the people we want to be. What is required is the appeal to our emotions that usually comes from experience. In some cases, such as that of the chain smoker having developed terminal cancer, the experience comes too late for the individual to benefit from it, although not necessarily too late for all personally affected by the tragedy to learn from it. But often even such tragedy fails to impress upon a relative or loved one the imperative need for personal change. VR may have the potential to enable us to experience the consequences of a particular course of action and learn from it before it is too late.
Policy Issues
'More examples of the indispensable!' remarked the one-eyed doctor. 'Private misfortunes contribute to the general good, so that the more private misfortunes there are, the more we find that all is well.' Voltaire (1758) We have argued that AI may have a useful ethical role to play in helping ordinary people consider, and even virtually experience, the consequences of their actions. However, this doesn't alter the fact that, in an organised society, people are barred from taking certain decisions that affect their lives. These decisions are taken out of their hands by ethical committees, judges, social workers, or doctors. For example: ¢ The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) decides whether women undergoing cancer treatment have the right to freeze (or, rather, to defrost) their eggs for use in subsequent fertility treament.
¢
A judge may order a woman with pregnancy complications to undergo a Caesarian section against her will. ¢ A team of social workers may decide, against a mother's wishes, that it is in the best interests of her children if they are taken away from her and put into care. ¢ Doctors may refuse parents a routine operation that would save the life of their Down's Syndrome child.
The provision of ethical-decision-making aids will not alter the fact that certain decisions are taken out of the hands of those directly affected. In certain cases this is precisely because involvement creates a conflict of interests between, for example, parents and their (future) children. However, this does raise the question, if those most affected by the consequences of decisions aren't best placed to make them, who is?
There seems to be a trade-off between impartiality and remoteness, even insensitivity. It is all very well for a judge to force a woman to undergo a Caesarian, knowing that he will never find himself in her position. If he did, his decision might very well be different, which raises the question of how impartial he really is. More extreme cases of judicial insensitivity, of middle-aged men labelling young victims of sexual abuse as provocative, are well known. What these cases further reveal is a lack of impartiality, since there is clearly more sympathy for one party to the case than for the other.
A stunning example of insensitivity was also provided recently by the Anglican Bishop Nazir-Ali of the HFEA. The HFEA has been responsible for denying many people access to the fertility treatment they want. A well-known case is that of Diane Blood, who was denied the right to conceive her late husband's child. Yet Bishop Nazir-Ali has spoken of the meaninglessness of the lives of those who choose to remain childless. This raises the issue of his insensitivity to the consequences of his pronouncements on those desperately childless people denied treatment by the HFEA. Furthermore, it raises the issue of the consistency, or inconsistency, of his reasoning.
One of the most notorious examples of inconsistency in ethical decision-making revolves around the distinction between actions and omissions. Doctors are forced every day to make difficult moral decisions. This results in decisions like: ¢ it is worthwhile performing a routine operation to save the life of a "normal" child ¢ it is wasteful performing a routine operation to save the life of a Down's Syndrome child
The effects of taking a life and refusing to save it (where you can) are the same. Sometimes it is not possible to save a life because, for instance, of a lack of organs for transplants. But even routine operations have been denied Down's syndrome children. The decision not to operate can only be defended with reference to the spurious (we think) moral distinction between actions and omissions which have the same consequences. Furthermore, there is clearly an inconsistency, not backed by any ethical rationale, between the reasoning applied with respect to Down's Syndrome and other children.
Here the question we want to ask is:
Can Artificial Intelligence be exploited to help society better make policy decisions?
Again, one issue we are concerned with is whether the differences between people and computers can be exploited to beneficial effect. We want to highlight two areas of concern in ethical policy-making:
¢ the need for consistency ¢ the need for impartiality
We consider each of these in turn.
Consistency
Because we only take into account that which we perceive as relevant to a particular decision, it is very easy for us to make inconsistent decisions in different cases simply by taking into account different considerations. Consistency in reasoning and decision-making is, on the face of it, something which computers are far better placed to achieve than we humans.
Impartiality
To discover the rules of society that are best suited to nations, there would need to exist a superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without feeling any of them, who had no affinity with our nature but knew it to the full . . .
Rousseau (1762)
We know that any person will necessarily have a particular background and set of experiences as a result of which they can't help but be biased in particular ways.
Worse, as certain groups in society are over-and underrepresented in particular policy-making professions, it is not just individuals but entire professions which suffer from a lack of impartiality.
Impartiality is a more difficult notion than consistency to deal with within the computational context. It means not taking a particular viewpoint, with particular interests. However, this is not to be identified with having no viewpoint so much as with being able to adopt every viewpoint! This is a kind of omniscience. Computers are good at storing and retrieving large quantities of data, but arguably experience is an important aspect of knowledge and so of impartiality. Can we identify impartiality with having all the relevant facts at hand (as conceivably a computer could do), or does it further require having all the relevant experiences?
We want to take the bold step of suggesting that experience can be represented as knowledge of the type which could be collected and represented in a database. Take the example of rape. Everyone knows what this involves. If it's not aggravated by violence, as in many cases of acquaintance rape (for which the rate of conviction is very low), then it's simply sex without consent. The degree of harm to the victim is not necessarily apparent to someone without any experience of the aftermath of rape. Indeed, how else can we explain the survey finding recently reported in the papers, that a surprising proportion of men would force a woman to have sex if they knew they could get away with it? Or the fact that until recently it was not regarded as a crime for a husband to force his wife to have sex? If such ignorance extends to some judges, and faced with a crime of sexual assault they are tempted to ask "Where's the harm?", then their ignorance carries a real cost to the victim and society as a whole. An expert system which collated the experiences of rape victims and those professionals who come directly into contact with them would be able to answer this question, so keeping remote judges "in touch". Better still, given reasoning capabilities and a dialogue manager, it could make a formidable Devil's Advocate. This is the kind of role we envisage for AI in the area of public decision-making. We don't want to hand decisions of public importance entirely over to computers. This is not because we think computers would make worse decisions than those made by individuals. If anything, we feel that a well-programmed ethical decisionmaking system would be likely to make better decisions, since it could incorporate knowledge equivalent to that of a number of individuals, as well as in-built consistency checking. The problem is that we would have a problem similar to that of corporate responsibility. This would not be a problem unique to an AI decision-making system. It is quite possible for a committee of people to vote for a decision for which no individual would be happy to take personal responsibility. However, having anticipated that allocating responsibility would be a problem if we were to hand ethical decisions over to computers, this approach seems best avoided.
There is a further potential problem related to that of responsibility. An AI decision-making system might, given sufficient "freedom" and through the ruthless application of the principle of consistency, arrive at decisions that the majority of people find completely abhorrent. In some cases this might simply mean that it was "ahead of its time"
1 . This would not be surprising as technologies such as in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), which were once regarded as ethically suspect, are now regarded as a relatively uncontroversial means of helping couples to conceive. Although this is not an ethical but a pragmatic issue, governments would not be prepared to implement decisions which were liable to cause widespread offence, as has been demonstrated by the issue of genetically-modified food. The other possibility is of course that the system might simply get it "wrong" 2 . The problem facing us is that we couldn't ever be certain whether the system's reasoning was ahead of ours or opposed to some of our most fundamental values. To rely on its decisions, against our intuitions, could itself be regarded as unethical, like "just obeying orders". Certainly it would be regarded so within such an ethical framework as Existentialism (MacQuarrie, 1972) .
The use of an expert system as a Devil's Advocate would increase rather than diminish accountability. The individuals making decisions would still be responsible for them. However, given their access to a Devil's Advocate, such decision-making professionals would no longer have the excuse of ignorance. Furthermore, dialogues which played a formative role in their policy-making could be made available to public scrutiny over the world-wide web.
To take the role of Devil's advocate, an expert system would have to be capable of taking a subjective viewpoint. This is something we denied our Ethical Decision Assistant on the grounds that handing over to a computer those decisions which necessarily involve an element of subjective reasoning would amount to an abdication of responsibility. Here, we positively want the system, not to incorporate a particular viewpoint, but to be capable of adopting a viewpoint opposed to that taken by a policymaker. This is because we feel that, in contrast with personal ethical decisions taken by private individuals, public policy decisions should not reflect the subjective values of those who happen to be taking the decisions on society's behalf. After all, those who find themselves making such decisions come to be in that position through their possession of expertise in, for instance, law, medicine, reli-gion, or philosophy, rather than because they have proved themselves to be moral experts.
Implementation
Our main concern has been to discuss the role AI could potentially play in helping individuals and societies to make ethical decisions. We have suggested both what an Ethical Decision Assistant could do for individuals making decisions in their personal lives, and what a Devil's Advocate could do to influence the decisions of policymaking professionals. While the issues surrounding implementation of these tools is not our primary concern, we will now sketch an outline for implementation, while recognising that at present this raises more questions than it answers.
The basic framework we have in mind for both the Ethical Decision Assistant and the Devil's Advocate is a planner. The output of the planner would be a plan, a chronologically ordered list of suggested actions which would achieve a certain state of affairs if performed in order. But this is not all, in fact it is the least significant part of the output. For both the Ethical Decision Assistant and the Devil's Advocate, the user is not only interested in what should or should not be done, he wants to know why it should be done, to know what the consequences of any actions might be to all those affected by them. Alongside the plan, therefore, the planner would also generate a list of major consequences relevant to the principal agents involved in the plan. It would also enumerate any "moral" propositions and rules (a special kind of knowledge, labelled as such) instantiated during the making of the plan, thus assisting the user even more. There would be a rooted tree of morality modules, modules containing propositions and rules. The root would contain a crosscultural basic "moral" code, catering for such uncontroversial beliefs as the sanctity of human life. The daughters of the root could then perhaps represent a variety of moral codes, each tailored to one or other culture, religion, or prominent belief system. Each plan generated by the system would instantiate from the root node, and from one daughter node of the tree only.
Although computationally expensive, forwards planning may have to be employed by the planner. Consider first the Ethical Decision Assistant. Backwards planning asks, "Is there any series of actions that can be performed in THIS world to make the world exactly like THAT?" The goals towards which a backwards-planning planner would work would be sets of propositions which together represented the desired post-decision world. The fundamental nature of a moral dilemma, however, is that the propositions which one desires to hold true in the postdecision world are mutually conflicting. So it would be a nonsense to ask the system how such an impossible world might be achieved. But this is exactly what would have to be done for a simple backwards planning approach. Our system would simply reply by telling the user that it had an impossible world as its goal. We would therefore need to adopt a different strategy.
There are at least two possible approaches to the problem, an adapted backwards planning approach, and an Nstep forwards planning approach. For the adapted backwards planning, there would still be goal sets which describe ideal impossible worlds, but the planner would be instructed to divide them into cohesive subsets, sets which did not contain mutually conflicting propositions. It would then plan for one of these cohesive goal subsets at a time, by using backwards planning to chain back from there to the current world. The planner would yield a clutch of plans (plus their relevant consequences, and the "moral" facts and rules employed), at least one plan for each of the cohesive subsets of goals. It would also include a pointer to whichever cohesive subset of goals had been achieved for each plan suggested. There is a major problem with this approach, however, which is the derivation of the cohesive goal subsets. Deriving maximally consistent subsets of a set of formulae is an extremely difficult problem. To achieve this, one would need to identify and eliminate all subsets which contain mutually conflicting goals, and this would require one to establish that there is not a proof for these subsets -a classically difficult problem in logic.
An alternative and superior approach would be N-step forwards planning. Forwards planning asks first of all without recourse to any goals"Is there any action at all which can be performed in THIS world?", an eminently sensible starting point for a planner attempting to solve moral dilemmas. Only later, after the planner has asked the question N times and is "imagining" a world in which N actions have been performed, does it begin to reason about where exactly it has got to, and how it might get from THIS new place to the goals. N-step forwards planning is computationally expensive, but the rewards could be significant. By using forwards planning, we would be inviting the system to explore a different search space altogether from the backwards planning search space, and thus its capacity for generating possible alternative plans would be greatly increased. It would be particularly useful in situations where there is a very small set of goals, perhaps even just one, and what is required is a thorough muse over "all" the possibilities. What is more, N-step forwards planning is much more akin to the human approach to moral dilemmas than backwards planning, where we tend to ask ourselves questions like, "If I do this, and they do that, and the others do nothing at all, what might happen as a result?"
The output for the Devil's Advocate would differ slightly from that for the Ethical Decision Assistant. The Devil's Advocate would suggest alternative plans to those proposed by the policy-maker, where the goals are not mutually conflicting. The planner could also be employed to contrast any desirable consequences following from its plans with any less desirable consequences following from the preferred plan of the policy-maker. In effect, this would give it the ability to reason about the desirability of means as well as ends. A further intriguing (but probably unethical!) possibility would be for the policy-maker to virtually experience the effects on affected individuals of their chosen plan. For example, a doctor making the decision not to operate on a Down's Syndrome baby with an intestinal blockage would be forced to experience virtual death by dehydration 3 . An interesting point emerges when one considers the legal consequences of comparing the plans suggested by the system, and all the information it provides on possible and probable consequences. Note the can of worms this approach would open, namely the significance attached to the issues of intent, foresight, and negligence (Kenny, 1988) . It seems clear that, having foreseen a possibility, however remote, one might be held responsible for it were it to come to pass. But then arguably, this might be a good thing, particularly in areas of public policy-making.
In addition to a planner, our system would require a sophisticated dialogue management system. This is because our Ethical Decision Assistant ought to be engaging if it is to encourage individuals to actually act in accordance with their avowed intentions. Similarly, our Devil's Advocate would need to be skilled in the arts of persuasion and dissuasion if it were to convince professionals to seriously consider alternative points of view.
Conclusion
Can AI technologies help people to make decisions for themselves about how to live their lives? Our answer to this question is positive, but with some important caveats. AI can be useful for working out and presenting to us the consequences our decisions, and for educating us in the processes involved in reaching those decisions. But we need to recognise the role of subjectivity in ethical reasoning. What AI should not attempt to do, is make the hard choices for us. If our Ethical Decision Assistant learns to recognise the patterns and inconsistencies underlying our decisions, it can alert us to these. What it should not do is deprive us of the freedom of choice by presuming to make value judgements on our behalf. We also need to recognise the leap that is required from following an abstract argument to actually taking the decision to act in accordance with it. Motivation can be a problem because the desire for instant gratification distracts us from the long-term consequences of our actions. For this reason, we think an AI approach which concerns itself only with the processes of ethical reasoning will be impoverished and ineffective. Using VR technology to enable us to experience the consequences of our actions before we embark upon them may be useful, although at the moment this remains an open empirical question.
Related to the question of how AI can help ordinary people to take informed ethical decisions and act in accordance with them is the issue of how those policy decisions are taken which affect our lives and yet are beyond our control as individuals. It is hoped that a widely available and accesssible Ethical Decision Assistant would result in a more informed public, better able to present their own views on ethical issues to those professionals with decision-making responsibility. We have further argued that balanced public policy-making requires consistent and impartial reasoning, and have suggested that achieving this is beyond the ordinary decision-making professional, from a particular background, equipped with a particular set of experiences. Here there may be a further role for AI to play. An expert system may incorporate knowledge and experience equivalent to that of a wide variety of individuals from diverse backgrounds, and it won't fail to sympathise with certain individuals while having no difficulty adopting the viewpoint of others. If we equip it with reasoning abilities and the facility to adopt different viewpoints, it can play a useful role, as Devil's Advocate, in educating decision-making professionals and challenging their assumptions.
